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There is much debate on whether the standard labor market search model can replicate
the cyclical properties of the labor market. In an inuential paper Shimer (2005a)
has argued that the textbook search model described in Pissarides (2000) can not
replicate the high degree of volatility of key labor market variables observed in US
data. In contrast, Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) reach the opposite conclusion in
a specication of the model where unemployment has little cost. Shimer (2004), Hall
(2005), Hall and Milgrom (2008), and Gertler and Trigari (2009) have noticed that
modeling wage rigidities can also help to account for the cyclical volatility of vacancies
and unemployment. Caballero and Hammour (1994, 1996, 1998) and more recently
Pissarides (2009) and Silva and Toledo (2011) have instead emphasized the importance
of allowing for some hiring costs, unrelated to aggregate labor market conditions. These
costs make the ex ante net value of creating a job small, which amplies the sensitivity
of job creation to aggregate shocks for the same reasons as in Hagedorn and Manovskii
(2008). Eyigungor (2010) exploits a similar mechanism.
The debate in this literature has for the most part focused on textbook versions
of the search model, usually driven by just neutral technology shocks. In addition,
quantitative analysis has by and large relied on calibration, assessing the predictions
of the model using a few moments typically measured only in US data. This paper
departs from this strand of work in three important dimensions. First, we endow the
search and matching model with a rich set of shocks and transmission mechanisms,
including those above mentioned (low cost of unemployment, wage rigidity and hiring
costs) which may considerably amplify and propagate the eects of shocks. Second, we
estimate the model using full information methods and seven observable series from
the labor market and national accounts. Third, we study the empirical performance of
the model in several European countries as well as in the US.
The focus of our analysis is on the extent to which technology shocks|as usually
modeled in the real business cycle literature|can explain the cyclical properties of the
labor market not only in the US but also in dierent European countries. In tackling
this issue, we highlight some important dierences in the cyclical behavior of unemploy-
ment, vacancies and workers ows between the US and Europe and across European
countries. These dierences allow us to quantify the importance of disturbances other
than technology shocks for the cyclical dynamics of labor markets across countries.
The model that we take to the data is a conventional real business cycle search
model, extended to incorporate many ingredients regarded as important by the business
1cycle literature to enhance the model's empirical performance. We allow for non linear
preferences, endogenous capital utilization and for adjustment costs to capital and to
job creation. Job separation probabilities are endogenous and privatively ecient|i.e.
they are set to maximize the private net surplus of jobs. Recruiting eorts require as
inputs both nal output and labor. Job creation involves incurring the traditional costs
of posting vacancies as well as other hiring costs unrelated to aggregate labor market
conditions. To model the importance of wage rigidity, the wage setting mechanism is
such that in a fraction of jobs wages are rigid as in Hall (2005), while in the remaining
fraction wages are set through Nash bargaining as in the conventional formulation
of the search model described in Pissarides (2000). This formulation nest full wage
rigidity and only Nash bargaining as special cases.
The model is driven by six possible shocks that dierent strands of the business cycle
and labor matching literature have regarded as important for the analysis of cyclical
uctuations. Allowing for several shocks is important to match key features of the data
and to estimate the model with full information methods. These disturbances consist
of neutral technology shocks, as in the conventional real business model by Kydland
and Prescott (1982) and Prescott (1986) and Shimer (2005); shocks to investment-
specic technology following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000), Fisher (2006),
Michelacci and Lopez-Salido (2007) and Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010);
stochastic variations in the discount factor of households as in Primiceri, Schaumburg,
and Tambalotti (2006); shocks to the search and matching technology as in Blanchard
and Diamond (1989, 1990), Hosios (1994) and Cheremukhin and Echavarria (2009); job
destruction shocks that lead to movements in job separation probabilities unrelated to
the net private surplus of jobs as in Shimer (2005a); and, nally, shocks to aggregate
demand which cause exogenous changes in households' wealth.
The model is taken to the data using a cross-country comparable data set for
unemployment, vacancies, unemployment ows, output, consumption and investment.
Worker ows data are taken from Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2010). Our data set
includes two Anglo-Saxon countries (the US and the UK), two Continental European
countries (France, and Germany) and two Nordic countries (Norway and Sweden) over
the period 1982-2007 although sample dates vary by country.
Our countries dier in terms of the average unemployment rate and in the rate
at which workers lose their job when employed or nd new jobs when unemployed.
The cyclical properties of the labor market are also dierent across countries in terms
of volatility and co-movement, in unemployment, vacancies and workers ows. While
there is a large literature contrasting the properties of real business cycles across coun-
2tries, (see for instance Ambler, Cardia, and Zimmermann 2004, and references therein)
similar cross-country comparisons for the labor market are scant in quantitative work
with search and matching models.
We separately estimate the model for each country, allowing parameters to vary
along several dimensions including levels of unemployment rate, worker ows, search
costs, workers' bargaining power, unemployment benets, wage rigidity as well as in
the properties of shocks driving cyclical uctuations. We adopt a Bayesian approach
to inference, using mixed frequency data (quarterly and annual). To this end we rely
on methods for state space models with temporarily aggregated observables, following
Harvey (1990). Using mixed frequency data is important for our analysis since it
enables us to cast the model at a quarterly horizon|given that in some countries
worker transitions occur at a high frequency|while in our sample workers ow data
are available just at an annual frequency. In addition to allowing for longer time series,
estimation in mixed frequency accommodates missing observations, so as to deal with
an unbalanced panel of aggregate time series, within each country.
Our main ndings can be summarized as follows:
1. Labor markets and national accounts data. When focusing on labor market vari-
ables, there are substantial cross-country dierences in the importance of shocks
for cyclical variations and in the elasticities to shocks, as evident from variance
decompositions and impulse response functions. Cross-country discrepancies are
considerably smaller for national accounts variables.
2. Technology shocks. Technology shocks are the key driving force of national accounts
data in all countries, while their contribution to labor market uctuations vary sub-
stantially across countries. These disturbances account for the bulk of the cyclical
uctuations in unemployment, vacancies and job nding probability observed in the
US data. They are also an important driving force of the cyclical dynamics of the
labor market in some European countries, such as Germany and particulary Swe-
den. In France, Norway and the UK the contribution of technology shocks to the
business cycle in the labor market is instead substantially more muted.
3. Matching and job destruction shocks. In Europe matching and job destruction
shocks explain a larger share of the business cycle in unemployment, compared
to the US, especially in France and the UK. The contribution of matching shocks to
the cyclical variance in the nding probability is also considerably larger in Europe.
These two observations reect some salient features of the data that are hard to
replicate with technology shocks only. First, the Beveridge curve is generally less
3stable in European countries than in the US, resulting in lower associations between
unemployment and vacancies. Second, the correlation between the job separation
rate and the unemployment rate is substantially larger in Europe than in the US.
Third, the correlation bettween the job nding rate and vacancies is substantially
smaller in Europe than in the US.
4. Dierences in parameter estimates. The estimated size of hiring costs unrelated to
labor market conditions is generally small, albeit comparatively larger in the US
and in Germany than in any other country. Job separation probabilities in France,
Germany, and the UK respond more to labor market conditions compared to the US.
This suggests that in these countries the separation margin is particularly important
to characterize the transmission mechanism of shocks.
Our analysis constitutes a rst step in understanding cross-country dierences in the
cyclical uctuations of the of labor market through the lens of a search model. Space
constrains generated by the scope of the paper prevent us from analyzing a number
of interesting questions raised by our results. For instance, we do not dissect the
key transmission mechanism(s) that allows technology shocks to generate considerable
volatility in aggregate labor market variables across dierent countries. Our empirical
analysis also abstracts from direct measures of wages to identify important structural
parameters of the model. This is an important omission, given that one of the main
lessons by Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) is that these data are important to identify
crucial properties of the transmission mechanism in search models.1 Nonetheless, we
have reasons to believe that at least some of our main conclusions should be robust
to further scrutiny. The correlation structure of unemployment, vacancies and workers
ows probabilities is signicantly dierent in the US and in some European countries.
It is these dierences that make unlikely that neutral technology shocks (at least as
usually modeled) can account for the lion's share of the cyclical uctuations of the
labor market in all European countries.
As it is standard in the search and matching literature, our analysis focuses on a real
model, where disturbances to aggregate demand cannot be the main drivers of cyclical
uctuations in output and employment. This might imply that some shocks here iden-
tied as driven by a change in technology would in other frameworks be interpreted as
disturbances to aggregate demand. For example, in alternative New Keynesian DSGE
models, where the presence of nominal rigidities makes output demand determined,
1For the case of the US, we pursue the identication of alternative transmission mechanisms using
the labor share as observable in Justiniano, Lopez-Salido, and Michelacci (2010).
4the literature has found evidence that demand shocks matter and that (neutral and
investment specic) technology shocks play a more limited role in generating business
cycles (Gal  and Rabanal 2004, Justiniano et al. 2010). Discerning the role of aggre-
gate demand versus technology shocks in cyclical uctuations has important normative
implications in the design of the appropriate monetary and scal policy responses to
shocks and it is clearly an important area for future research.
Regarding the structure of the paper, Section 2 characterizes dierences in labor
market dynamics across the OECD. Section 3 characterizes the economy while Section
4 presents the equilibrium conditions of the decentralized economy. Section 6 discusses
our choice for priors. Section 7 reports on estimation results.
2 Data description
We rst briey mention the sources for our data-set and then highlight important
dierences in the cross-country properties of selected variables in terms of means,
volatilities, and cross-correlations. It is these dierences that we interpret through
the lens of the estimated structural model later on. Therefore, in sections 6 and 7 we
extensively refer back to properties of the data highlighted here.
2.1 Data sources
The countries included in the analysis are the US, France, Germany, Sweden, Norway,
and the UK. We look at national accounts data(GDP, consumption and investment),
as well as of labor market variables (unemployment, vacancies, nding and separation
probabilities). Time series for national income accounts, unemployment and vacancies
are available at quarterly frequency. Worker ow probabilities are only available at an
annual frequency.
To increase data comparability, we rely as much as possible on data compiled by
the OECD. Data for GDP, consumption, and investment are taken from the OECD
national income accounts except for Norway. Consumption corresponds to real per-
sonal nal consumption expenditures, investment to total investment expenditures in
private xed investment. National accounts data for Norway are obtained from Statis-
tics Norway and for Mainland only, hence excluding the part of Norwegian economic
activity directly related to oil extraction and exploration in the North Sea. For Sweden,
only GDP is taken from Statistics Sweden, due to longer time coverage, since in the
OECD database, this series starts in 1993. In all countries, GDP, consumption, and
investment are expressed in per-capita terms, i.e. divided by population.
5Data on vacancies, unemployment, and employment are obtained from the OECD
Main Economic Indicator online database. The unemployment rate is simply total
number of unemployed over total labor force, which is measured by the sum of em-
ployed and unemployed workers. Data on job vacancies (in thousands) are used to
construct the vacancy rate as the ratio of job vacancies to the sum of job vacancies
and employment, consistent with the denition of the job opening rate used in JOLTS
for the US.2
Worker ows data are taken from Elsby, Hobijn, and Sahin (2010). Consistent with
earlier comments an important feature of the Elsby et al. (2010) worker ow measures
is that original data sources also come from the OECD, making them comparable across
countries. These authors use annual measures of the unemployment stock by duration
and quarterly measures of the unemployment rate to infer the (yearly) average con-
tinuous time Poisson exit rate from unemployment and entry rate into unemployment
from employment. Their methodology is intended to correct for the time aggregation
bias emphasized in Shimer (2005b). The implied worker ows rates are available at an
annual frequency only, and they correspond to the average monthly Poisson rates in
each year. We convert these Poisson rates into quarterly probabilities by calculating
the quarterly job nding and job separation probability that generate an expected du-
ration of an unemployment spell and an expected duration of an ongoing job consistent
with the continuous time Poisson arrival rate calculated by Elsby et al. (2010). In the
conversion we assume that a worker who loses a job in a quarter, can nd a new one
in the same quarter which is consistent with the timing convention of the structural
model introduced in Section 3.3
2.2 Descriptive statistics
The sample periods are 1982:I-2007:IV for the United States (USA), 1989:I-2007:IV
for France (FRA), 1991:I-2007:IV for Germany (DEU), 1980:I-2004:IV for the United
Kingdom (GBR), 1983:I-2007:IV for Norway (NOR), and 1983:I-2004:IV for Sweden
(SWE). Sample dates are largely determined by the Elsby et al. (2010) coverage of




 denote the average Elsby et al. (2010) monthly Poisson arrival rate in year  for job
nding and job separation, respectively. The implied expected duration of a job in quarters is 1=(3sm
 )
while the analogous expected duration of an unemployment spell (again in quarters) is 1=(3fm
 ). We
dene the yearly average of the quarterly job separation probability as equal to  = 3sm
 , which is
consistent with the model assumption in Section 3 that a new job lasts at least one quarter. The
analogous job nding probability is set equal to f = 1=[1=(3fm
 ) + 1], which is again consistent with
the model assumption that workers, who lose their job in a period, can nd another one in the same
period. So the minimum duration of an unemployment spell is zero.
6worker ows, although additional considerations constrain us further in a few countries.
For instance, the starting date for Germany is due to German reunication, while the
availability of data on vacancies determines the start of the sample in France, as well
as the end date in the United Kingdom.
Data are expressed in logs, multiplied by 100 and detrended using the Hodrick-
Prescott lter with smoothing parameter equal to 1600 for observables available at a
quarterly frequency and equal to 100 for observables at the annual frequency. Due to
the mixed frequency of the data, in statistics reported below involving nding and sep-
aration probabilities the time unit is one year, while it is one quarter for all remaining
series.
To begin highlighting the diversity in labor markets across the countries in our
sample, Panel A) in Table 1 reports sample means for the unemployment rate u, and
the job nding and job separation probabilities, denoted by f and , respectively.
As expected the unemployment rate in France, Germany and the UK is higher than
in the US. In contrast, the unemployment rate of the two Scandinavian countries is
below that in the US. Finding and separation probabilities in France, Germany, and
the UK are signicantly lower than in the US, while Nordic countries lie in between the
levels in the US and these other European countries. The level of the Unemployment
Insurance replacement rate measured by the percentage of net earning in work over
ve years of unemployment, comes from the OECD database on Benets and Wages.
As it is well known, benet levels are substantially lower in the US than in any of
these other countries. Panel A also reports a cursory look at the value of the matching
elasticity to unemployment implied by a simple OLS regression of the log job nding
probability f on the logged vacancy-unemployment ratio v=u. The inferred elasticity
of the matching function to unemployment is in the range 0.7-0.8. At least with this
simple regression, this is slightly higher than the conventional estimates discussed in
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) but not too far away from the range of values of
0.7-0.75 obtained by Shimer (2005a) using a similar methodology on US data.
The standard deviation of our variables, using each country's specic sample are
reported in Panel B. The analogous value relative to the same statistic in the US when
restricting the analysis to a common sample is shown in Panel C. To save space we
just omit the relative volatilities for consumption and investment. The overall picture
emerging from these comparisons is that while GDP, consumption and investment are
in general more volatile in Europe than in the US, dierences in volatilities are larger
for labor market variables, both across the Atlantic and within Europe. Observe for
instance that France, Germany and the UK have lower standard deviations in unem-
7Table 1: Descriptive statistics.
Country: US France Germany Norway Sweden UK
A) Mean (%)
Unemployment u 6.0 9.1 8.7 4.0 4.4 8.8
Finding f 62 18 15 52 43 25
Separation  10 2.5 1.6 4.7 3.9 3.1
UI-replacement rate 36 57 66 58 63 53
Matching elasticity to u 78 73 70 74 80 70
B) Standard Deviation (%)
SD(Unemployment u) 8.2 5.3 7.2 13.6 16.3 8.1
SD(Vacancies v) 13.5 6.2 13.6 16.0 22.0 11.5
SD(Finding f) 4.8 5.9 9.6 10.4 9.5 9.1
SD(Separation ) 2.5 8.0 10.3 14.7 21.5 9.0
SD(Consumption c) 0.7 0.7 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.5
SD(Investment i) 3.7 2.6 4.4 6.5 5.2 4.2
SD(GDP) 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.2
C) Relative SD over common sample, US series=1
SD(Unemployment u) 1 0.61 0.86 1.7 1.9 1.0
SD(Vacancies v) 1 0.49 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.1
SD(Finding f) 1 1.1 1.9 2.2 2.0 1.8
SD(Separation ) 1 3.2 3.9 5.7 8.9 3.8
SD(GDP) 1 0.94 1.6 1.9 1.5 1.2
D) First order autocorrelation
Unemployment u 0.89 0.89 0.87 0.82 0.92 0.94
Vacancies v 0.93 0.79 0.90 0.76 0.89 0.90
Finding f 0.65 0.18 0.19 0.61 0.66 0.42
Separation  0.13 0.30 0.31 0.11 0.74 0.12













Notes: Notes: The UI-replacement rate is the percentage of net earnings in work received as unem-
ployment benets as reported from the OECD. The matching elasticity to unemployment is obtained
from an OLS regression of the log job nding probability f on the logged vacancy-unemployment
ratio v=u. Standard deviations and correlations are calculated for the variable in logs. For nding
and separation probabilities the serial correlation is at the annual level.
8ployment and vacancies than the US, although the reverse is true for GDP, consumption
and investment. Scandinavian countries have instead larger standard deviations in un-
employment and vacancies than the US, although this higher volatility is in line with
the larger standard deviations observed for GDP, consumption, and investment. A
salient feature of the data is that nding and separation rates are considerably more
volatile in all ve European countries relative to the US. This last observation may be
puzzling. However, we have found similar results when using alternative measures for
unemployment ows available for France and the UK constructed by Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2008), once these are aggregated and detrended at an annual frequency.
Panel D) of Table 1 reports the rst order autocorrelation of variables|recall dif-
ferences in time units across series. In general, there are no major dierences across
countries in the serial correlation of unemployment and vacancies. In contrast, nding
probabilities are more persistent in the US than in the UK, and, in particular, France
and Germany. But generally cross-country dierences in persistence are small. Over-
all, separation rates exhibit little serial correlation in the US and Europe, with the
exception of Sweden where they are more persistent than nding rates. Finally, the
serial correlation of GDP in Norway is remarkably smaller than in any other country,
likely due to oil production, which indirectly aects the value of mainland GDP.
Figure 1 plots the Beveridge curve for the six OECD countries in our sample.
The vacancy rate and the unemployment rate are both in logs, and the scale of axes is
maintained unchanged for the dierent countries. The gure highlights some important
cross-country dierences in the cyclical properties of the labor market. In the US,
Norway and to a lesser extent Sweden vacancies and unemployment line up along a
well behaved negatively sloped relation. In contrast, the Beveridge curve would not
seem fairly stable in France, Germany and the UK.
Table 2 reports contemporaneous correlations focusing on labor market variables
listed by row. The correlation between unemployment and vacancies is substantially
higher in the US than in Germany, UK, and in particular France, where it is close to
zero. In contrast, the same statistic is quite similar across the Scandinavian countries
in our sample and the US. These two observations are in line with the evidence in
Figure 1. The degree of comovement between unemployment and the nding rate is
highest in the US, with the converse being true for separations. This suggests that
the separation margin may be relatively more important in explaining unemployment
dynamics in Europe than in the US, consistent with the conclusions by Elsby et al.
(2010). Finding and separation probabilities are negatively correlated in al countries
except Norway where the correlation is positive and in the UK, where it is close to


























































































































Notes: The Beveridge curve in the US and Europe. All series are detrended. Vacancy rate is
total vacancy over the sum of vacancy and employment, unemployment rate is unemployment
over total labor force, both in logs.
10Table 2: Contemporaneous cross correlations in data
Data: Unemp. GDP Cons. Inv. Vacancy Finding Separation
US
Unemp. 1.00 -0.80 -0.63 -0.80 -0.79 -0.90 0.28
Vacancy -0.79 0.74 0.66 0.81 1.00 0.80 -0.39
Finding -0.90 0.76 0.67 0.77 0.80 1.00 -0.13
Separation 0.28 -0.21 0.03 -0.17 -0.39 -0.13 1.00
France
Unemp. 1.00 -0.66 -0.61 -0.65 -0.05 -0.61 0.64
Vacancy -0.05 0.34 0.17 0.25 1.00 0.08 -0.34
Finding -0.61 0.55 0.50 0.52 0.08 1.00 -0.12
Separation 0.64 -0.79 -0.68 -0.77 -0.34 -0.12 1.00
Germany
Unemp. 1.00 -0.82 -0.56 -0.67 -0.65 -0.73 0.72
Vacancy -0.65 0.73 0.34 0.72 1.00 0.67 -0.52
Finding -0.73 0.75 0.38 0.79 0.67 1.00 -0.33
Separation 0.72 -0.65 -0.46 -0.50 -0.52 -0.33 1.00
Norway
Unemp. 1.00 -0.52 -0.58 -0.54 -0.75 -0.39 0.39
Vacancy -0.75 0.52 0.56 0.55 1.00 0.34 -0.29
Finding -0.39 0.52 0.45 0.49 0.34 1.00 0.48
Separation 0.39 -0.11 0.19 -0.12 -0.29 0.48 1.00
Sweden
Unemp. 1.00 -0.71 -0.53 -0.79 -0.73 -0.86 0.81
Vacancy -0.73 0.69 0.41 0.62 1.00 0.79 -0.46
Finding -0.86 0.83 0.62 0.77 0.79 1.00 -0.73
Separation 0.81 -0.64 -0.70 -0.64 -0.46 -0.73 1.00
UK
Unemp. 1.00 -0.76 -0.72 -0.74 -0.38 -0.82 0.40
Vacancy -0.38 0.73 0.59 0.45 1.00 0.52 -0.00
Finding -0.82 0.74 0.75 0.85 0.52 1.00 0.02
Separation 0.40 -0.33 -0.27 -0.22 -0.00 0.02 1.00
Notes: See notes at Table 1.
11zero. The positive association of the separation rate with the nding rate in Norway is
noteworthy, although visual inspection of the series suggests that might have partially
to do with a couple of outliers.
To summarize, the properties of labor market data dier, at times considerably,
both between the US and Europe, as well as within European countries. Broadly
speaking, dierences with the US seem more marked with Germany, UK and particu-
larly France, rather than with Norway and Sweden. Nonetheless, the last two countries
stand out in the relatively high volatility of the separation rate. As discussed in Section
7, these empirical regularities play a crucial role in understanding the identication of
shocks as well as cross-country dierences in the importance of dierent disturbances
for uctuations within our estimated structural model, to which we now turn.
3 Description of the decentralized equilibrium
We describe the assumptions that characterize the decentralized equilibrium.
Job output and technologies There is one consumption good, the numeraire,
which is produced according to
Y = Ft(jK;N) = At (jK)
 N
1 ; (1)
with 0 <  < 1: Here j denotes capital utilization, K the capital stock, N the amount
of labor intensive intermediate goods used in production, while At is the standard
source of temporary cyclical uctuations considered in general equilibrium versions of
the standard search model, see Andolfatto (1996), Merz (1995), and Den-Haan, Ramey,
and Watson (2000). We assume that
at  lnAt = aat 1 + "at: (2)
Labor intensive intermediate goods are produced in jobs which consist of rm-worker
pairs. A worker can be employed in at most one job. A job produces a unit of
intermediate goods.
Capital Accumulation Households accumulate capital and rent it out to rms.
Following Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), we allow for the presence of in-
vestment adjustment cost. Adjustment costs to capital are important to reproduce the
high serial correlation of investment in the data. As a result, the law of accumulation
12of the capital in the hand of the representative household (see below) can be described
as follows:









where  (jt) is the depreciation rate while the function T satises T = T 0 = 0 in
deterministic steady state and T 00 > 0: Out of the deterministic steady state, T; T 0
and T 00 are all strictly positive.4 These assumptions imply that at the steady state the
relative price of installed capital in terms of new capital goods equals unity. In the
above expression It is the amount of investment expenditures measured in nal output.
The variable 't represents the investment specic technology, as in Solow (1960) and
Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997). It evolves according to the following AR(1)
process:
't = ''t 1 + "'t: (4)
At a more general level, these shocks characterize the eects of arbitrary shocks to
the demand for capital. Following this logic, Shimer (2010) interprets a shock to ' as
characterizing the eects of a change in nancial frictions on the demand for capital.
As in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (2000) and Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2008, 2010), owners of physical capital can control the intensity with which the capital
stock is utilized. Formally, we let jt measure capacity utilization in period t. The
eective amount of capital services that households supply to rms in period t is given
by jtKt. We assume that increasing the intensity of capital utilization j implies a faster
rate of capital depreciation  (j) so that





To guarantee that the depreciation rate is an increasing and convex function of the rate
of capacity utilization we assume that 0; 1; 2 are non negative. We normalize capital
utilization to one in steady state. This modeling of capital utilization guarantees the
existence of a steady state equilibrium even in the presence of a trend in the investment-
specic technology.
Search frictions The labor market for workers is subject to search frictions.
The matching process within a period takes place before production in the period.





where T00 > 0.
13So workers and rms that are matched in period t begin active relationships in the
same period. Unmatched workers remain jobless. Workers and rms whose matches
are severed can enter their respective matching pools and be re-matched within the
same period. We modify standard timing conventions in the discrete time version
of the search model (see for example Shimer, 2010) to guarantee that unemployment
duration spells can be arbitrarily close to zero. This is important to match the empirical
evidence of some countries such the US where unemployment duration is remarkably





whose arguments s and v denote the masses of workers searching for a new job and of
vacancies, respectively. This function is homogeneous of degree one, increasing in each
of its arguments, concave, and continuously dierentiable.6 Under (6), the probability














which is decreasing in the rate at which an unemployed worker nds a job given by
f  n=s. We assume that
mt  lnMt = (1   m)m + mmt 1 + "mt; (7)
which characterizes a shock to the matching technology, i.e. a skill mismatch shock.
These shocks do not aect the productivity of a job, but have a direct eect on the
outside options of workers. These shocks tend to induce a positive co-movement in the
job nding and job separation rate and shift the Beveridge curve.7
Job creation Free entry by rms determines the size of the vacancy pools. Pro-
cessing the applications for a vacancy requires some recruiting services that are ex-
changed in a perfectly competitive market. The amount of recruiting services required
for training n workers and processing applications for v vacancies is given by:
 R(n;v) = nn + vv; n;v  0; (8)
5For example, with this formulation the expected duration of unemployment in steady state is
equal to 1
f   1; where 0 < f < 1 denotes the job nding probability.
6We will check that, over the relevant range, it always satises nt(s;v)  min(s;v).
7Shocks with this property are usually dubbed reallocative, see Blanchard and Diamond (1989,
1990), Davis and Haltinwanger (1999) and Balakrishnan and Michelacci (2001) for evidence about
the relevance of these shocks. Cheremukhin and Echavarria (2009) also argue that these shocks are
important to explain the cyclical volatility of labor market variables and of the labor wedge in the
US.





1 ; the amount of recruit-











which is an extended formulation of the conventional search model. The parameter
n matters for the costs of search ineciencies. This is because training costs are
paid before wage bargaining takes place, which leads to a natural hold-up problems.
As emphasized by Pissarides (2009) this ineciency matters little for results. In the
standard formulation of the search model (see for example Pissarides, 2000) creation
costs are linear in vacancies which corresponds to the case n = 0 . Pissarides (2009)
emphasizes the importance of job creation costs unrelated to aggregate labor market
conditions, n > 0 , for reproducing the volatility of key cyclical variables in the US;
see also Rotemberg (2006) and Silva and Toledo (2011). The term in n
Mts in (9) are
due to search frictions in the labor market and they imply that job creation costs fall
when more workers are searching for a job. This represents the search component of
the total costs of job creation.
Recruiting services are produced by combining labour intensive intermediate goods
and some nal output services whose unitary cost is normalized to one. We also allow
for the presence of adjustment costs in the supply of recruiting services. The supply









where St is the input in the production of recruiting services. These input services are
obtained by using X units of labour intensive intermediate goods and O units of output









The function G characterizes adjustment costs in the production of recruiting services.
It satises the condition G = G0 = 0 in deterministic steady state and G00 > 0:
Out of the deterministic steady state, G; G0 and G00 are all strictly positive.8 These





where G00 > 0.
15assumptions imply that in steady state, adjustment costs are irrelevant and the relative
price of S and R are equal. Adjustment costs in the supply of recruiting services
slow down the adjustment of vacancies. This helps in reproducing the strong serial
correlation of vacancies observed in the data and the fact that the response of vacancies
to shocks is typically hump-shaped (vacancies are sluggish to respond). Fujita and
Ramey (2007) and Ravn and Simonelli (2008) have emphasized that the conventional
search model has problems in reproducing this feature of the data.




where 0 <  < 1, and pt denotes the equilibrium price of a labor intensive intermediate







units of labour intensive intermediate goods and by spending
ot = (1   )rt (13)
units of nal output. The expression for the cost of recruiting services in (11) allows for
dierences in the factor content of recruiting costs which Shimer (2010) has shown to
matter for the response of the economy to shocks. When recruiting services are obtained
by just using labor|which in our formulation corresponds to the case  = 1|Shimer
(2010) derives a neutrality proposition whereby shocks to labor productivity have no
eects on unemployment.9 Absence of adjustment costs requires setting G00 = 0:
Job destruction The worker in the job needs to invest to maintain the job
productive. Greater eort in maintenance involves a greater survival probability of the
job. But greater investment in maintenance also comes at cost to the worker because
it reduces the amount of leisure he enjoys. We assume that, when the job destruction
probability is t; the worker enjoys utility from leisure equal to e
 
t
 O(t) which is
increasing and concave in t; O0 > 0; O00 < 0: We also assume that in steady state
O = 0; which is just a normalization. The stochastic disturbance t evolves as
t = t 1 + "t: (14)
9In addition to  = 1; the analysis in Shimer (2010) regarding the neutrality proposition would
require that capital is absent  = 0 and that n = 0 so that  R(n;v) = vv:
16so it has mean zero in steady state. The shock "t will induce a specic shock to the
job separation rate. Greater t reduces the value of leisure enjoyed by the worker and
thereby reduces the job separation probability. This modeling of the job separation rate
is convenient because it allows to solve the model using linear methods, still preserving
key properties of models with endogenous job separation. In particular the equilibrium
job separation rate will fall when the job net surplus increases, which is the key insight
of any model where job separation is set optimally to maximize the job net surplus, see
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Moreover, shocks to the endogenously determined
separation rate will have nil rst order eects on the expected net value of a newly
created job, due to a conventional envelope condition. As emphasized by Pissarides
(2009), this is another important property of models with endogenous separation.
We assume that job destruction decisions are privately ecient and are always set
so as to maximize the private net surplus of a job. This is coherent with Barro (1977)
who argue that two parties in direct contact with one another can always arrange the
terms of their relationship so to achieve private bilateral eciency. This is the natural
equilibrium outcome if investment in job maintenance is observable and veriable and
we assume that rms and workers sign long-term contracts that specify fully contingents
plans for workers'investment in job maintenance. The same outcome would also be
obtained in equilibrium if we were to follow Hall (2009) in assuming that the worker
at the start of the relationship buys out the rm by paying to the rm the full value
of the job.
Unemployment benets A worker searching for a job who remains jobless at
the end of period receives unemployment insurance benets equal to z: Benets are
nanced through lump sum taxes and the government budget is balanced in each
period.
Splitting of surplus If a rm and a worker who have met separated, both
would loose the opportunity of producing and each would have to go through a time-
consuming process of search before meeting a new suitable partner. Hence, there is a
surplus from a job. We allow for dierent ways of splitting such surplus. The surplus
splitting mechanism is determined at the time when the match is formed. We assume
that with probability 1  the wage determination process in a job is governed by Nash
bargaining (Pissarides, 2000). In this case the worker and the rm split the net surplus
of a job by using a generalized Nash bargaining solution in which the bargaining powers
of the worker and the rm are  and 1   ; respectively. Division of the surplus is
17accomplished via wage payments.10 Bargaining takes place after the searching process
has concluded, so unemployment is the relevant outside option for the worker. When
unemployed, the worker cashes unemployment benets and has to wait for next period
to search for a job. This timing assumption is particularly appropriate because it will
imply that the Hosios (1990) condition is satised.11
With probability  the job is instead characterized by rigid wages as in Shimer
(2004) and Hall (2005). If these wages are inside the bargaining set, then the rm pays
to the worker the deterministic quantity !. If the wage is outside the bargaining set
the outside option of either the worker or the rm binds.12
Aggregate resource constraint The aggregate resource constraint is:
Yt = It + Ct + Dt + Lt;
where Dt is an aggregate demand exogenous component (say due to government ex-
penditures or net trade balances) that we assume evolves as
dt  lnDt = (1   d)d + ddt 1 + "dt: (15)
Moreover we have that
Lt = (1   )p

tSt (16)
represent the total amount of output units spent for job creation purposes, which is






10As emphasized by Haefke, Sonntag, and Van-Rens (2007) and Pissarides (2009), the allocation
of resources in the decentralized equilibrium is unaected by whether bargaining occurs continuously
over time or just at the start of the employment relationship|and then wages are set through long-
term wage contracts. What matters is just the share of the surplus that the rm and the worker
appropriates as implied by . So we are silent about the exact time prole of wages.
11An alternative assumption would be to assume that matching and bargaining occurs simultane-
ously. This would be a ction given that newly created jobs are created after a match. Under this
alternative assumption the Hosios condition would not be satised.
12In the presence of a unique deterministic rigid wage, the wage can jump discontinuously in response
to a shock that makes the outside option of one party binding. To solve this problem we follow Hall
(2005), Hall and Milgrom (2008) and Gertler and Trigari (2009) in assuming that wages are always
strictly within the bargaining set. Although this assumption is reasonable, this approach might create
problems in estimating the model. In Justiniano, Lopez-Salido, and Michelacci (2010) we allow ! to
be an job specic time varying idiosyncratic shock. This makes solution methods based on linearizing
the equilibrium conditions of the model more appropriate. With stochastic rigid wages outside options
always bind for at least some workers and some rms and shocks aect the fraction of workers and
rms for which outside options are binding. Since fractions move continuously in response to shocks,
solution methods based on linearization are appropriate. To simplify exposition, here we avoided
pursuing this line of reasoning.
18denotes instead the total recruiting costs due to the purchase of labour intensive inter-
mediate goods.
Representative household The economy is populated by a continuum of iden-
tical innitely-lived households of measure one. Each household is thought of as a large
extended family which contains a continuum of workers. The population of workers
in the economy is normalized to one and there are no movements in and out of the
labor force. We follow, among others, Andolfatto (1996) and Den-Haan, Ramey, and
Watson (2000) in assuming that workers pool their income at the end of the period and
choose consumption and eort costs to maximize the sum of the expected utility of the
household's members; thus a representative household exists. Workers can be either
employed or non-employed. The utility obtained by the representative household in a
period is given by:




where et denotes the number of employed worker at the end of period t; Ct denotes
aggregate consumption, 	 is a leisure cost of working, the last term accounts for job
maintenance costs which are incurred by all jobs producing in the previous period. We







When  = 1 preferences are logarithmic, when  = 0 preferences are linear as in
the textbook presentation of the search model in Pissarides (2000). The household's
discount factor is Bt where
bt  lnBt = (1   b)b + bbt 1 + "bt; (19)
so that as in Primiceri, Schaumburg, and Tambalotti (2006) and Justiniano, Primiceri,
and Tambalotti (2010) we allow for shocks to the discount factor. Generally speak-
ing, these shocks characterize the eects of changes in the supply of capital|due for
example to changes in nancial market conditions that aects households' ability to
save and invest. For example, notice that, when preferences are linear ( = 0), bt
represents an exogenous shocks to the rental price of capital services.
We assume that the claims on the prot streams of rms are traded. In equilibrium
the household owns a diversied portfolio of all such claims, implying that the discount
factor used by rms to discount future prots from time t+i to t is consistent with the
household's intertemporal decisions and so they share the same discount factor. The
19representative household maximizes the expected present value of its instantaneous
utility (18), subject to the per period budget constraint:




t jtKt + (1   et)z   t (20)
where wb
t is the average wage paid in a bargained wage job while t represents lump
sump taxes, which satises
t = Dt + (1   et)z:
This last follows from the fact that government budget is balanced. Notice that (20)
incorporates the assumption that households accumulate capital, they decide capital
utilization and thereby the capital services jtKt to supply to rms.
Timing We adopt the following convention about the timing of events within a
period t:
i. Aggregate shocks "at, "'t; "mt; "t; "bt; and "dt are realized;
ii. Investment in job maintenance;
iii. Old jobs realize whether they are destroyed (which occurs with probability t)
and workers can search for a new job in the same period;
iv. Decisions about job creation are taken;
v. Old jobs and new jobs (resulting from matches at time t) produce output. Then
income is pooled, invested and consumed. Next period begins.
4 Equilibrium conditions
We now characterize the equilibrium conditions of the decentralized economy.
Consumption, investment and capital utilization At every point in time
the marginal value of wealth t (i.e. the Lagrange multiplier of the representative













































 : relative risk aversion parameter
	 : eort cost parameter
 : elasticity of output to capital
i; i = 0;1;2 : depreciation rate of capital parameters
T 00 : capital adjustment costs
G00 : recruiting services adjustment costs
 : weight of labor goods in creation costs
n: training cost
v : cost of vacancy
 : elasticity of matching function wrt u
z : unemployment benets
 : workers' bargaining power
 : importance of wage rigidity
! : wage in rigid wage jobs
 : job separation elasticity
 : steady state separation rate
B : steady state discount factor
D : steady state exogenous demand
i; i = a;';;b;d;m : serial correlation of shocks
i; i = a;';;b;d;m : sd of innovation to shocks
Shocks
a: investment-neutral technology shock
': investment-specic technology shock
: job destruction shock
b: shock to discount factor
d: shock to aggregate demand
m: shock to matching technology
Other functions
F : production function
R;  R : recruiting services for job creation
n : matching function
q : probability of lling a vacancy
E : expected value
which establishes a marginal indierence condition between increasing consumption Ct
or increasing investment It: In the expression 
t is the time-t expected shadow value
21Table 3: Legend (continued)
Values
H : value of searching
U : value of being unemployed at end of period
V : net (private) surplus of a job
J : value of a job net of the value of searching
W b : value to the worker of a bargained wage job
W r : value to the worker of a rigid wage job
P b : value to the rm of a bargained wage job
P r : value to the rm of a sticky wage job

 : marginal value of capital




jt : capital utilization rate
Nt : labor intensive intermediate goods used to produce output
It : investment expenditures
Ct : consumption
Dt : exogenous aggregate demand component
Lt : total output units cost of job creation
St : input in the production of recruiting services
nt : new jobs created
st : number workers searching
ut : unemployment rate
et : number of workers producing
ft : nding rate
pt : marginal value of one labor intensive intermediate good
wb
t : wages paid to worker in a bargained wage job
rt : cost of one unit of recruiting services
rvt : cost of processing applications for one vacancy
rnt : cost of training one worker
rkt : price of one unit of capital services
22of capital at time t + 1; which satises the following arbitrage condition:

t = BtEt f[1    (jt+1)]







is the equilibrium price of one unit of capital services at time t+1 equal to the marginal
productivity of a capital service in the period.




where 0(jt) denotes the derivative of the function  in (5) with respect to capital
utilization. Equation (24) equates the marginal gains of increasing capital utilization
to its marginal cost. The gain is the value of the increase in income. The cost is the
value of the fall in capital of 0(jt) at time t + 1.
Value of a job The value of searching for a job in period t measured in utils is









+ (1   ft)Ut (25)
where W i
t; i = b;r denotes the value to the worker of being employed in a job where
wages are set through Nash bargaining i = b; or where wages are rigid i = r: The right
hand side of (25) takes into account that with probability 1   ft the worker remains
unemployed whose value is denoted by Ut that solves
Ut = tz + BtEt (Ht+1): (26)
This incorporates the fact that the unemployed worker cashes unemployment insurance
benets z and he waits for next period before searching for a job. The time-t (private)
net value in utils of a job is dened as equal to Vt  P i
t +W i
t  Ut: This is the net surplus
that workers and rms have to split when bargaining over wages. This incorporates
the assumption that bargaining takes place after the searching process has concluded,
so unemployment is the relevant outside option for the worker. We prove below that
Vt satises
Vt  tpt   	   tz + BtEt
h


















t   Ht  Vt + Ut   Ht (29)
is the value of a job net of the expected value of searching for a new job, which is equal
to Ht:The rst three terms in (27) measures the net instantaneous gains of the job,
equal to the dierence between the value produced in the job and the sum of the eort
cost of working and the benets that the worker would obtain if unemployed. The last
term in (27) is the future gains from producing today. These gains are net of the future
investment in job maintenance and they are obtained only if the job is not destroyed.13
Notice O is utility from leisure and so it enters positively in the expression.This is
convenient to simplify notation.
A derivation for the expression of the net surplus in (27) We now derive
from rst principle the expression for the net surplus of a job in (27). Let denote by
Pt the value of a job to the rm and by Wt the value of the job to the worker. Both
expressed in utility terms. With this notation we have that
Vt  Pt + Wt   Ut
Let wt denote a worker's wage. Then
Pt = t (pt   wt) + BtEt [(1   t+1)Pt+1]
The value of a job to the worker is equal to
Wt = twt   	 + BtEt
h





which incorporates the fact that the worker loses the job in the next period with
probability t+1: In that case the worker can search for another job in the same period,
whose value is Ht+1. By summing Pt to Wt and then subtracting the expression for Ut
in (26) from the resulting expression we obtain that
Vt  tpt   	   tz   BtEt (Ht+1)
+BtEt
h





which is equal to
Vt  tpt   	   tz + BtEt
h





which is analogous to (27). 
13An alternative assumption would be to assume that Vt  Jt + Wt   Ht: This is equivalent to
assuming that matching and bargaining occurs simultaneously. This would be a ction given that
newly created jobs are created after a match. Under this alternative assumption the Hosios condition
would not be satised.
24Job destruction The optimal level for job maintenance is set to equate the
marginal cost of the investment in maintenance to its return|equal to the expected





0(t) = Jt: (30)
By inverting this expression we can obtain that
t  exp[ (lnJt   lnJ)   t] (31)
where Jt is given in (29), J is its steady state value while t characterizes a job specic
shock to the separation rate: This last specication is parsimonious and captures key
properties of model with endogenous job separation. When  = 0; the job separa-
tion rate is just driven by the exogenous shock t. When  > 0; investment in job
maintenance is more valuable when the job net surplus is greater. As a result the
job destruction rate falls. This negative relation between job destruction and the job
net surplus is the key insight of any model where job separation rate is endogenously
determined so as to maximize the job net surplus (see for example Mortensen and Pis-




 .14 Notice that (30) implies that the relation between the net surplus and the
separation rate is characterized by an envelope condition. As emphasized by Pissarides
(2009) this implies that changes in the separation rate has nil rst order eects on the
expected net value of a newly created job. The model is parameterized just in terms
of  and . Intuitively  determines the average steady state separation rate while 
determines the elasticity of the job separation rate to the job net surplus.
Splitting of the job net surplus Let P i
t; i = b;r denote the value to the rm
of a job where wages are set through Nash bargaining i = b; or where wages are rigid
i = r: Recall that W i
t; i = b;r denotes the analogous value to the worker. Notice that
for any i we have Vt = P i
t + W i
t   Ut: We assume that Nash bargaining implies that
W
b
t = Vt + Ut and P
b
t = (1   )Vt
The value to the worker of a job with rigid wages satises
W
r

















; ; > 0 (32)
leads exactly to (31) as an equilibrium outcome.
25while the value to a rm of a job with rigid wages satises
P
r







To understand the expression notice that the rst two terms calculate the value of the
job net prots, the last term is simply the expected future value of the job to the rm.
The job in the next period is destroyed with probability t+1:
Free entry Since vacancies are posted till the exhaustion of any rents, in equi-
librium their value would be equal to zero so the following free entry condition will
hold













is the job nding rate while rvt and rnt denote the cost of processing the applications
for a vacancy and training a worker, respectively. This expression equates the expected
cost of lling the vacancy (equal to the sum of the cost of processing application for the
vacancies plus the cost for the worker training) to the expected net capital gains (the
term in the right hand side). In equilibrium the cost of processing the applications is









































t + (1   )P
b
t : (35)
This conditions simply says that jobs are created up to the point where the average
cost of creating a new job is equal to its expected net value.
26The market for recruiting services The price of one recruiting services, de-

































Notice that when G = G0 = 0; we obtain the familiar condition p
t = rt: This condition
equates the marginal costs of producing one unit of S to the marginal gains.15 The
rst term in the right hand side of (36) is the net increase in income due to the increase
in the current period supply of recruiting services. The second term is simply in the
increase in income due to the increase in the supply of recruiting services of next period,
which is due to the reduction of next period adjustment costs.
In equilibrium the total demand of recruiting services has to be equal to its supply.

















From using (13) and the denition of St|which is the input in the production of
recruiting services|we obtain the amount of output expenditures in recruiting services
can be expressed as follows:
Lt = (1   )p

tSt (38)
The total amount of labor intensive intermediate goods produced is equal to et: Given
(12) and (13), the amount of labor intensive intermediate goods used for producing
nal output is then given by




This again follows from using (12) and the denition of St
Unemployment and pool of searchers There is an inow to the stock of
workers searching equal to tet 1; and an outow equal to ft 1st 1. Due to this the
stock of workers searching for a job evolves as
st = (1   ft 1)st 1 + tet 1 (40)
15Equation (36) can be easily obtained by solving the problem of the producers of recruiting services.


















t is the cost of producing one unit of St: The sector producing recruiting services takes this
price as given. By writing the rst order condition with respect to St; we immediately obtain (36).
27Since the labor force is normalized to one, the number of employed workers who produce
output at the end of period satises
et + ut = 1 (41)
where ut denotes the unemployment rate, i.e. the number of worker who do not produce
in the period. This is equal to
ut = (1   ft)st (42)
which evolves as
ut = ut 1 + t (1   ut 1)   ftst (43)
This says that unemployment changes are equal to the dierence between the inow
into and outow from unemployment.16 Notice that this formulation implies that
unemployment at time t is inuenced by both the separation rate and the nding rate
at time t: The outow rate from unemployment is equal to
outt = ft (44)
the inow rate to unemployment is
int = t (45)
which is consistent with the denition in Elsby et al. (2010).
4.1 Welfare
It is always useful to analyze the welfare properties of the model relative to the Hosios
(1990) benchmark|often labeled as the  =  condition. It is easy to prove that
16Notice that if we dene the separation rate as equal to
e t = (1   ft)t;
we obtain a more canonical expression for the law of motion of unemployment Lagging the second
and replacing in the rst and then into the second again
ut = (1   ft)[ut 1 + t(1   ut 1)]
= (1   ft)ut 1 + (1   ft)t   (1   ft)tut 1
which simplies to
ut = ut 1   ftut 1 + e t (1   ut 1)
which is a more conventional expression for the law of motion of unemployment. Under this denition
steady state unemployment is equal to
u =
(1   f)
(1   f) + f
=
e 
e  + f
:
28Proposition 1 The decentralized equilibrium is socially ecient if the Hosios condi-
tion holds ( = ), there are no appropriability problems (n = 0); wages are exible
( = 0) and there are no unemployment benets (z = 0).
The Proposition highlights that there are three possible sources of ineciencies in
the model. All them stem from frictions in the labour market and they have already
been emphasized before. Ineciencies arise because of either failure of the Hosios
(1990) condition ( is dierent from ); or because of appropriability problems in
creation costs as in Caballero and Hammour (1996, 1998) (n is dierent from zero);
or because of wage rigidity as in Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005) ( is dierent from
zero). Notice that these frictions could have dierent welfare costs depending of the
type of shocks and their sign. When the Hosios condition is satised it is optimal to
set benets to zero, z = 0: Notice that if either n is positive or  is positive it never
exists a value of  that makes the decentralized equilibrium ecient.
5 Model solution and state-space representation
This section briey describes the solution of the model and its state space representa-
tion. Let
Et [f (t+1;t;t 1;e
"t; )] = 0, (46)
denote the collection of equilibrium conditions from Section 4, where t, "t and   are
vectors of endogenous and exogenous variables, exogenous i.i.d. disturbances, and,
unknown parameters, respectively.
For a given  , the rst step is to nd the non-stochastic steady state, which requires
solving for the root of a function in f, the nding probability. Having obtained the non-
stochastic steady state we then log-linearize (46) around it and solve the resulting linear
system of rational expectation equations using the Anderson and Moore algorithm (see
Anderson (2008)). This procedure yields the following system of transition equations
^ t = G( ) ^ t 1 + M ( )"t, (47)
where the b denotes log deviations from the steady state, while G( ) and M ( ) are
conformable matrices whose elements are functions of  .
The state space representation of the model solution has (47) as transition equation.
The associated observation equation
yt = Z^ t + Rt (48)
29maps some of the elements in ^ t into a vector of observables, yt; through the selection
matrix Z. The vector t represents idiosyncratic disturbances that do not enter the
equilibrium conditions, and the matrix R maps each of the i.i.d. elements in t to a
single observable series, with R having more columns than rows. Idiosyncratic distur-
bances capture deviations between some observables and the corresponding variable in
the model and are discussed at length in the next Section.
Given the data, Y = [y1;y2;::;yT]; the likelihood function associated with each
parameter   is obtained through the Kalman lter using the transition equation (47)
and observation equation (48). This allows us not only to estimate model parameters
but also to infer (through the Kalman smoother) the shocks, ["0
t;0
t]; bueting our
economy at each point in time. We later exploit this feature to decompose cyclical
uctuations across shocks and to conduct counterfactual experiments.
6 Bayesian Inference
We use Bayesian methods to characterize the posterior distribution of the structural
parameters (see An and Schorfheide 2007 for a survey). The posterior distribution
combines the prior with the likelihood function obtained with the Kalman lter. The









corresponding to quarterly (t) unemployment rate, vacancy rate, GDP, consumption
and investment, as well as annual () averages of the quarterly nding and separa-
tion probabilities, respectively. GDP is dened as output net of recruiting costs,
GDP = Y   L. The data are discussed in Section 2, which also details the country
specic samples. Our guiding choices in eliciting priors warrant a thorough discussion,
especially given the relatively short samples used in the estimation.
Calibrated parameters A few parameters that are dicult to pin down without
level information are calibrated. In some cases we set the same value for all countries.
For instance, the quarterly depreciation rate of capital  is set to 10 percent per year,
2:5 percent per quarter which is similar to Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997).
The discount factor B is xed to .9901, delivering a steady state real interest rate of
4 percent, while the elasticity of output to capital, ; is calibrated to 0.33. Finally,
we impose a coecient of relative risk aversion, , equal to one, corresponding to log
preferences. Other parameters are calibrated using country specic information. The
replacement rate of unemployment benets, is set to the value reported in Table 1
30for each country. The steady state value of D
GDP, which measures the share of GDP
not accounted for by the sum of consumption and investment, is chosen using nominal
national accounts data. This delivers percentage shares of 17% for the US, 24% in
France, 21% Germany, 19% the United Kingdom, 27% Norway, and, 34% Sweden.
Notice that this share is smallest in the US, although close to that in the UK.17 Finally,
the steady state value of the separation probability, ; is calibrated to the sample means
reported in Table 1.
For the remaining parameters, the prior is identical across countries and described
in Table 4. The second column corresponds to the type of density, with \N" denoting
Normal, \B" Beta, \G" Gamma, \U" Uniform, and \I" Inverse Gamma1. Beta distri-
butions are reserved for variables dened over the [0,1] intervals, while G and I are only
dened for the positive real line. For each distribution the third and fourth column
report the prior mean and standard deviation, respectively. To help gauge the range
of values entailed by each density, the last column reports 98 percent prior probability
intervals.
Matching elasticity, factor content of recruiting service, and eort cost
The elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment, , is centered
around 0:6. This value accords well with the evidence summarized by Petrongolo and
Pissarides (2001) who conclude that \a plausible range for the empirical elasticity of
unemployment is 0:5 to 0:8 ". Shimer (2005a) argues in favor of a higher value of
 = 0:72; in line with the simple regression results reported in Table 1. There is scant
evidence about the value of  that measures the weight of labor goods in creation costs,
though Shimer (2010) argues that this parameter might matter for cyclical uctuations.
For this reason we specify a fairly at Beta prior, with prior probability intervals that
cover the unit interval. Our prior for the disutility of labor 	 is informed by the
estimation of the model with higher frequency data for the US. In Justiniano, Lopez-
Salido, and Michelacci (2010), we estimate the model for the US using monthly and
quarterly data which, given the larger sample, delivers more precise estimates.18 The
estimate for 	 obtained in that sample under a uniform [0,50] prior, once converted
to a quarterly frequency, suggests a value for this parameter considerably smaller than
0.4. However, in order not to penalize specications with low net (private) surplus for a
job, we center our prior around this higher value. Furthermore, prior beliefs regarding
17More specically D
GDP = 1   C+Y
GDP , encompassing therefore government expenditures and net
exports.
18We checked that the US results with the higher frequency data-set used in Justiniano, Lopez-
Salido, and Michelacci (2010) and the low-frequency data set used here yield consistent results.
31Table 4: Parameters Prior
Parameter Distribution Mean SD Interval
 B 0.5 0.25 0.03 0.97
	 G 0.4 0.1 0.21 0.56
 B 0.5 0.25 0.03 0.97
n U 250 144 5 495
v U 250 144 5 495
 B 0.6 0.1 0.36 0.87
 B 0.5 0.25 0.03 0.97
 G 1.2 0.6 0.25 3.01
T 00 G 4 1 2.05 6.69
G00 G 4 1 2.05 6.69
2 G 0.25 .2 0.11 0.93
a B 0.85 0.1 0.55 0.99
i, i = ;b;d;m;' B 0.6 0.15 0.25 0.90
a I 1 1 0.26 5.62
 I 4 1 0.53 11.59
b I 1 1 0.26 5.62
d I 1 1 0.26 5.62
m I 1 1 0.26 5.62
' I 2 1 1.05 22.5
SD idiosyn. shock
in f,  and v B 0.3 0.2 0.01 0.82
Steady states priors







p B 0.15 0.1 0.01 0.47
Notes: Priors in estimation. First column, corresponds to the parameters names. Second column
is the type of density. \N"is for Normal, \B" for Beta, \G" for Gamma, \U" for Uniform, and \I"
for Inverse Gamma. Third column is the mean while the fourth is the standard deviation. The last
column reports the prior percentage band with 98 percent probability coverage. For unemployment
the band is reported as a dierence with the sample mean. The replacement rate of unemployment
benets, the steady state value of the D over Y   L ratio and the separation rate  are calibrated to
their value in Table 1.
	 for other countries are grounded on the assumption that workers preferences are
similar across countries, so that working eort costs also vary little across countries.
Adjustment costs and job separation elasticity For the parameter T
00 that
governs adjustment costs in capital, we follow Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti
32(2010) (and references therein) in centering the Gamma density at 4, albeit with a fairly
large standard error. Absent any evidence to guide an alternative choice, we specify
the same distribution for adjustment costs in recruiting services, G00. The elasticity
of depreciation with respect to utilization is determined by the ratio
2
1, where the
denominator is pinned down by the steady state and it is equal across countries to
0.035. We elicit a prior for 2 which implies an apriori median for
2
1 of roughly 5.5, but
with a standard deviation of 5.5 as well, thereby encompassing a wide range of values
suggested in the literature, see Rios-Rull, Schorfheide, Fuentes-Albero, Santaeulalia-
Llopis, and Kryshko (2011) for a discussion. Finally given the large debate on the
importance of uctuations in job separation probabilities over the business cycle we
set a pretty loose prior for the parameter  that governs the sensitivity of job separation
to the job net surplus.
Wage rigidity and bargaining power We consider fairly uninformative priors for
the importance of wage stickiness , and workers' bargaining power . There is much
debate in the literature about the value of these parameters. Hall (2005) argues in favor
of  = 1, while Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) are inclined toward  = 0. Similar
considerations apply for the value of  that characterize workers' bargaining power.
For this reason, we use a Beta-distribution with mean 0.5 and standard deviation
0.25, which is very close to a uniform distribution and, as mentioned above, covers
the unit interval. We impose that in steady state wages are the same in a rigid and a
bargaining wage job. This implies that the two types of jobs dier just in their wage
response to aggregate labor market uctuations and formalizes the idea that wage
rigidity does not matter for steady state allocations. From the estimation point of
view, this parametrization reduces by one the set of parameters to be estimated.
Steady state unemployment rate Following the methodology outlined in Del-
Negro and Schorfheide (2008) we also impose priors on two relevant steady state quan-
tities. First, we set a tight prior on (100 times) the steady state unemployment rate,
choosing a Normal with a mean informed by the sample average reported in Table 1
and standard deviation of 0.2. This approach helps shield against implausibly large
steady state unemployment rates which might spuriously help the model to t the data
for reasons discussed in Cole and Rogerson (1999).
Job creation costs The second steady state prior concerns the costs of job creation,
and requires a detailed explanation. As emphasized by Pissarides (2009), job creation
33costs, particularly if unrelated to labor market conditions, can signicantly inuence
the transmission mechanisms of neutral shocks. We discipline this mechanism through
a prior on the steady state costs of job creation, while adopting an agnostic Uniform
[0,500] for the parameters governing the contribution of vacancy costs, v, and training










Roughly # measures the cost of hiring a worker relative to the productivity of the
worker in the job. Silva and Toledo (2011) calculate that hiring a worker requires 4:3
percent of the quarterly wage of a newly hired worker and that hiring also requires





p is roughly the labor share multiplied by 1   . So we obtain that, when the
labor share is equal to 1   ,
#  (0:043 + 0:55)
2
3
(1   )  0:593:
We take this value of 0.593 as an upper bound for the set of reasonable values of #. For
this reason, the prior for this parameter is centered at 0.15, with a standard deviation
of 0.1. This has a 98 percent prior probability interval roughly covering [0.01,0.47],
such that the value for # suggested by Silva and Toledo (2011) is well into the right
tail of the prior distribution.19
Shocks All shocks are normalized to zero in logs (such that means are one in levels),
except B (discount factor), and D (exogenous demand component), whose calibrated
levels have been already discussed. Regarding persistence, our prior Beta density for a
is centered at 0.85, suggesting that neutral technology shocks are highly autocorrelated,
following the RBC literature. For all remaining shocks, i; i = ';;b;d;m;, the prior
mean is 0:6 with a standard deviation of 0:2, which allows a fairly broad degree of
autocorrelation.
As it is customary in the empirical DSGE literature, Inverse Gamma 1 densities
are preferred for the prior standard deviation of the innovation to the shocks. While
19The median is 0.12 while the 90 percent prior probability band covers instead [0.03,0.34], making
evident that this density favors values considerably smaller than those suggested by Silva and Toledo
(2011). Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) also add some costs from keeping capital idle which might
justify increasing the variance for the prior.
34we allow the means to dier somewhat across shocks, we select the degrees of freedom
that parametrize this density to be equal to 2, which results in an innite variance.
The estimation of model parameters through likelihood based methods is unfeasible
when the number of shocks is smaller than the number of series in the dataset. In this
case the model is stochastically singular, counterfactually predicting that some linear
combination of the observables must hold exactly in the data. To break stochastic
singularity we introduce idiosyncratic errors in vacancies, nding and separation prob-
abilities. These shocks, given by t in section 5, enter only the observation equation
of each corresponding series, and are assumed serially uncorrelated and orthogonal to
any other disturbance in the model. Therefore, idiosyncratic disturbances are unable
to pick up the comovement in the data.
Aside from the above technical considerations, there are good reasons to allow for
some idiosyncratic error in the measure of vacancies, job nding and job separation
probabilities. For the case of vacancies, this idiosyncratic error may capture some well-
known measurement issues with the Help Wanted Index. With regards to labor ows,
idiosyncratic shocks may account for time aggregation issues. Furthermore, alternative
measures of these probabilities tend to accord well in their cyclical components but can
display notable dierences in high frequency behavior. This is evident for France and
the UK in comparing our measures of worker ows probabilities with those based on
the data by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) and for the US when contrasting our
time series with those in Shimer (2005b).Idiosyncratic shocks can also pick up model
misspecication, due to movements in and out of the labor force that the model ignores.
To limit the inuence of idiosyncratic disturbances, the volatility of idiosyncratic
shock i = v;find;sep in country j is conned to the interval [0,qi
j], with qi
j equal to half
of the standard deviation of series i in that country. The estimated standard deviation
of each idiosyncratic shock is equal to qi
j ; where  has a Beta prior centered at 0.3
with standard deviation 0.2. Despite this approach, the extent to which idiosyncratic
disturbances may undermine our ability to learn about the cyclical behavior of the
labor market should be judged by how important are these shocks over the business
cycle, an issue analyzed extensively in the next section.
7 Estimation results
The presentation of our results begins with the estimated parameters in Section 7.1.
Section 7.2 comments on the model's ability to t cross-correlations and volatilities.
The role of technology shocks in generating uctuations is taken up in Section 7.3. To
this end, we use a historical decomposition of the observables as driven by only tech-
35nology shocks (both neutral and investment specic) to show that their contribution
to labor market uctuations varies considerably across countries. Before remarking on
other shocks, Section 7.4 briey digresses on the role of wage rigidity in increasing the
response of labor market variables to neutral technology shocks. The contribution of
all shocks to business cycle variations across countries and series is presented in sec-
tion 7.5. We conclude in section 7.6 with a cross-country comparison of transmission
mechanisms, which helps probe why the importance of shocks diers across countries
and series.
7.1 Parameters estimates
The posterior mode for the parameters in each country is reported in Table 5, other
steady state quantities are reported in Table 6, while measures of uncertainty are
omitted due to space considerations.20
The model estimate for the degree of wage rigidity, , is highest in the US at 0.57,
suggesting that wages are more rigid than in Europe. This might be because European
trade unions target their demand for wages in new jobs to aggregate labor market
conditions. Conversely,  in the US is estimated at 0:51; hinting that workers have
greater bargaining power in Europe than in the US.
The elasticity of the matching function to unemployment  is similar across coun-
tries and close to the value reported in table 1. In contrast, estimates for the elasticity
of separations  vary considerably across countries, from 0.44 in Sweden to almost 2
in Norway, with the US on the low side at 0.83. This is in line with the conclusions
by Elsby et al. (2010) that the separation margin matters more in Europe, see also
Section 2. Recruiting relies mostly on labor, especially in the US where  is highest at
0.9, consistent with the model specication in Shimer (2010).
According to our estimates there is a fair degree of adjustment costs in both cap-
ital and recruiting eorts in most countries. While the former friction is standard in
empirical RBC models, we nd that a similar mechanism is crucial to account for the
high persistence of vacancies. As emphasized by Fujita and Ramey (2007) and Ravn
and Simonelli (2008), this is a salient empirical feature of vacancies and labor mar-
ket tightness. Posterior estimates for 2 imply relatively large elasticities of capital
20When estimating structural models it is not uncommon to nd alternative parameter congu-
rations that provide similar characterizations of the data. To gauge whether identication issues
manifest in multiple local modes, we maximize the posterior density using alternative optimization
algorithms initialized with at least 50 random draws generated from a uniform grid, overdispersed
relative to our prior. While this procedure is silent on the role of priors in achieving identication, it
does reveal a unique parameter mode for each country.
36Table 5: Cross-country estimates, parameters values
Country: US France Germany Norway Sweden UK
 0.51 0.76 0.57 0.63 0.59 0.80
	 0.35 0.33 0.36 0.24 0.34 0.38
0 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
1 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035
2  100 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.27
 0.90 0.78 0.78 0.61 0.71 0.69
n 0.36 0.00 0.14 0.18 0.00 0.00
v 1.25 499.65 13.67 1.18 10.21 6.03
 0.79 0.82 0.69 0.75 0.81 0.70
 = z=w 0.34 0.57 0.66 0.58 0.63 0.53
 0.57 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.55 0.19
 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.03
 0.83 1.01 1.14 1.97 0.44 0.78
T 00 3.62 4.95 3.26 3.11 3.93 2.04
G00 3.28 3.51 3.22 3.76 3.20 3.49
a 0.95 0.96 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.95
 0.64 0.70 0.60 0.11 0.52 0.71
b 0.64 0.69 0.60 0.11 0.52 0.70
d 0.68 0.68 0.79 0.32 0.38 0.73
m 0.78 0.52 0.61 0.62 0.72 0.70
' 0.48 0.60 0.25 0.13 0.22 0.25
a 0.22 0.23 0.31 0.42 0.34 0.27
 2.62 6.15 14.64 12.89 9.90 4.31
b 0.40 0.31 0.64 3.16 1.22 0.37
d 2.28 1.04 2.58 5.71 2.48 3.45
m 1.75 7.00 9.84 12.54 2.79 8.92
' 3.69 2.65 6.90 13.17 9.53 5.26
SD idiosyn. shock, f 0.98 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97
SD idiosyn. shock,  0.72 0.95 0.96 0.95 0.99 0.96
SD idiosyn. shock ,v 0.08 0.90 0.08 0.51 0.57 0.59
Notes: Estimates. In all estimates  is set to one. The replacement rate of unemployment in benets
is set to the value in Table 1. The parameter  and B are set equal to the 0.33 and 0.99, respectively.
The value of the wage in bargained jobs in steady state is equal to !.
utilization to variations in the return to capital in all countries. As explained later,
this accords well with the importance of variable capital utilization for the propagation
of intertemporal shocks, such as variations in the households discount factor and the
37investment specic technology (Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Human 1988).
Table 6 reports the steady state implied by these estimates. In each country the
nding probability and unemployment rate are well in line with the sample means in
Table 1.
The estimates of n in Table 5 tends to be higher in Germany than in other countries
but training costs are in general small. Vacancies posting costs v vary substantially
across countries. However, this masks signicant dierences in the magnitude of job
creation costs as a share of GDP. For this reasons, Table 6 also reports the ratio between









and aggregate GDP equal to Y   L. This ratio tends to be lower in Europe due to
lower worker turnover.21
To characterize the value of rents in existing jobs, Table 6 reports two statistics.















The latter expression takes into account that training is a cost paid at the start of the
employment relationship. This expense aects the incentive to create new jobs. The
term r+
1+rn in (51) is simply the ow value equivalent of the ex ante cost in training.22
The numbers for AFS and PFS reported in Table 6 indicate that ex-ante and ex-post
surpluses are similar. This implies that training costs matter little for the economic
21To see this result more formally notice that Y =
p

































which is increasing in f and  which are both larger in Europe. This explain why L
T
GDP tends to be
low in Europe even if n and v are higher.
22The expression r+








This means that x is the ow value equivalent of the ex ante cost in training.
38responses to neutral technology shocks for the reasons discussed in Pissarides (2009).
Our estimates for the values of the job net surplus seem to be in line with the values
used by Shimer (2005a) in his calibration|although one has to be careful here because
the choice for the time length of a period matters. As a point of reference the ow
value of surplus is equal to 0.05 in the calibration of the search model in Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2008) and equal to 0.6 in the calibration by Shimer (2005a).
Table 6: Cross-country estimates, means
Country: US France Germany Norway Sweden UK
Finding, f 0.609 0.203 0.15 0.52 0.436 0.238
Unemployment, u 0.06 0.089 0.083 0.042 0.047 0.088
Separation,  0.1 0.025 0.016 0.047 0.038 0.03
Job creation, n 0.094 0.023 0.015 0.045 0.036 0.027
Labor for cons., N 0.897 0.906 0.914 0.951 0.947 0.909
C=GDP 0.593 0.524 0.554 0.493 0.424 0.574
I=GDP 0.237 0.236 0.236 0.237 0.236 0.236
K=GDP 9.462 9.438 9.435 9.46 9.445 9.438
LT=GDP (100) 3.566 0.457 0.298 0.849 0.611 0.323
Labor share 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
# = r(n + vf

1 )=p 0.50 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.24 0.16
PFS 0.63 0.38 0.29 0.40 0.33 0.42
AFS 0.61 0.38 0.28 0.38 0.33 0.42
Notes: Steady state means corresponding to the parameter estimates in Table 5. LT denotes the
total costs for job creation (both for labor and output). GDP is equal to (Y   L): PFS is equal to
(p   	
   z)=p and corresponds to the ex-post ow value of the net surplus of a job. AFS is equal to
(p   	
   z   r+
1+r n)=p and corresponds to the ex-ante ow value of the net surplus of a job.
Properties of shocks Neutral technology shocks are highly persistent in line with
the RBC literature. The volatility of its innovations is lowest in the US and highest
in Norway and Sweden, consistent with the discrepancies in business cycle variability
documented in Table 1. Nonetheless, as it will become evident shortly, cross-countries
dierences in the volatility of neutral shocks are rather small, at least relative to the
variation in estimates for the standard deviation and persistence of other disturbances.
The properties of investment shocks, '; vary considerably across countries. These
shocks are most persistent in France, with ' at 0.6, but much closer to white noise in
the remaining European countries, particularly Norway where ' is 0.13|in line with
39the very low correlation for GDP reported in Table 1. In general investment shocks
are substantially more volatile in Europe than in the US, especially so in Norway.
For Norway this last observation likely reects the indirect eects of oil extraction,
a notoriously capital intensive industry. As for the remaining European countries,
the volatility of these shocks is somewhat out of line with the dierences in standard
deviations for investment documented in section 2.2.
Estimates of the volatility of job destruction shocks  are also fairly dierent across
countries, being ve times larger in Norway than in the US, and even more so in Ger-
many. The variability of innovations to matching shocks, m is lowest in the US and
Sweden, and highest in Germany, Norway and the UK. These dierences in estimates
accord well with the high correlation between nding and separation probabilities ob-
served for these countries, see Table 2. This is because, as emphasized by Hosios
(1994) and further discussed in Section 7.6, disturbances to the matching technology
have the distinctive feature of generating a positive comovement between nding and
separation probabilities. Regarding persistence, the autocorrelation in separation and
matching shocks are broadly in the 0.5-0.8 range, while Norway stands out again, with
0.11 estimates for  and m:
Idiosyncratic shocks are quite volatile, and more so in Europe, which largely reects
the larger standard deviations in labor market data compared to the US. The variance
of idiosyncratic shocks is pretty large in all countries for both nding and separation
probabilities and close to the upper bounds allowed, that is the estimated  close
to 1. The sole exception is the US, where the standard deviation of idiosyncratic
disturbances to unemployment inows is signicantly smaller than the upper bound.
This is an indirect indication that the model ts this series best in the US, as we latter
corroborate. Idiosyncratic shocks to vacancies are generally small with the exception
of France. This is mostly due to the low association between the vacancy rate and the
unemployment rate and nding probability present in the French data (see Table 2),
which is a common theme throughout our discussion of results for France.
7.2 Model t: correlogramm and volatilities
We now discuss the model's ability to t key moments of the data. We rst focus on
the comovement properties and then analyze how the model performs in matching the
volatility of national accounts and labor market variables.
Figure 2 presents the actual and model-implied correlation pattern of the seven
variables used to estimate the model for the US. Figure 2b-f in the Appendix present
analogous graphs for the other ve countries in the sample. The panel in row i and
40column j corresponds to the cross-correlation between series i and up to 3 lags, k =
0;1;2;3, of series j. Given the mixed frequency of the data, one lag corresponds to
one year for moments involving unemployment ow variables, and to one quarter for
the remaining series. The moments in the data are given by the solid line. Dashed
lines instead report 95 percent posterior probability bands obtained for each country
using the estimated parameter mode reported in Table 5 to simulate 4000 articial
model replications of length equal to the data. The median of the implied posterior
distribution of the model generated correlations is shown by the dotted line.
Since each gure reports a fairly large number of moments, we limit our discussion
to fairly broad features of the model and the data, and we concentrate on the US.
Overall, Figure 2a suggests that the model matches reasonably well the correlation
pattern of all the seven observables in the US although, admittedly, some condence
intervals are large, which reects both the relatively short sample period and the low
sample frequency considered for some variables. When looking at labor market vari-
ables, the model is successful in reproducing the remarkably high serial correlation of
vacancies, unemployment and job nding probabilities observed in the data. The cross-
correlations between the unemployment rate, worker ows probabilities and vacancies
generated by the model align reasonably well with their empirical counterparts. For
instance, median model-based statistics for the separation probability are fairly close
to the actual moments, particularly at lags of this variable. Similarly, the comovement
properties between vacancies and unemployment generated by the model generally
agree with the data, although for leads of vacancies the correlations are somewhat















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42Consistent with ample evidence from the RBC literature, the model captures the
serial correlation properties of national accounts variables quite well. Overall, the em-
pirical correlation between labor market and national accounts variables are also within
the posterior probability bands, although the model predicts a somewhat stronger as-
sociation between GDP and unemployment than in the data. Within the national
accounts series, the model underpredicts the correlation between consumption and
investment, mainly due to the substitution eect induced by investment specic tech-
nology shocks. The model t of the correlation pattern for the other countries is
somewhat similar and omitted to save space, see Figure 2b-f in the Appendix.
Table 7 characterizes the model's ability to reproduce the standard deviation of
the observables. Each column corresponds to a dierent country, each row to a dif-
ferent variable. As in the case of cross-correlations, we report the median and [5-95]
percentiles of the model implied distribution of standard deviations, together with the
same statistic in data|identical to the number reported in panel (B) of Table 1. Note
that the cross-country variation in implied volatilities is consistent with the hetero-
geneity observed in the data. Model-based standard deviations of unemployment and
vacancies also broadly agree with the data, being if, anything, slightly larger in the
model than in the data, in Germany, and, for vacancies in Sweden.
Empirical and model generated standard deviations of nding and separation prob-
abilities are in close agreement, except for the UK and Sweden where the model falls
short of capturing the high volatility in separations. Focusing on national accounts
data, model-based volatilities in GDP and investment are reasonably in line, albeit
somewhat above, their empirical counterparts. In general the model overstates the
volatility of consumption, particularly in the Scandinavian countries, owing in part to
the comovement problem induced by investment specic technology shocks, alluded to
earlier. In summary, with only a few exceptions, the model accounts reasonably well
for the observed dierences in volatility across countries.
43Table 7: Cross-country estimates, volatilities
Country: US France Germany Norway Sweden UK
Unemployment rate
Median 11.4 6.4 11.3 17.2 21.3 8.0
5-95 percentiles 7.5-17.6 4.0-10.1 6.2-19.8 12.5-24.3 13.4-35.0 5.0-12.7
Data 8.2 5.3 7.2 13.6 16.3 8.1
Vacancy rate
Median 15.0 9.7 18.1 17.6 31.7 12.5
5-95 percentiles . 9.4-23.6 6.1-16.1 11.1-29.0 12.7-25.7 19.3-52.7 7.9-20.5
Data 13.5 6.2 13.6 16.0 22.0 11.5
Finding probability
Median 4.4 5.7 10.3 9.6 9.1 9.2
5-95 percentiles 2.9-6.8 4.1-7.8 6.6-15.9 6.9-13.0 5.7-15.0 6.3-13.2
Data 4.8 5.9 9.6 10.4 9.5 9.1
Separation probability
Median 3.0 8.0 10.6 14.6 10.1 6.6
5-95 percentiles 2.9-3.9 7.0-9.3 7.5-14.2 11.0-18.8 8.0-19.0 4.7-8.9
Data 2.5 8.0 10.3 14.7 21.5 9.0
GDP
Median 1.3 1.2 1.7 2.1 2.0 1.4
5-95 percentiles 0.8-1.9 0.7-2.0 1.0-3.0 1.6-2.9 1.3-3.2 0.9-2.3
Data 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.2
Consumption
Median 1.2 1.2 1.7 2.8 2.6 1.6
5-95 percentiles 1.0-1.6 0.9-1.7 1.3-2.3 2.4-3.4 2.1-3.4 1.2-2.1
Data 0.7 0.7 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.5
Investment
Median 5.0 4.3 6.5 8.1 7.2 6.0
5-95 percentiles 3.4-7.4 2.6-7.1 3.9-10.8 5.9-11.3 4.7-11.3 4.0-9.1
Data 3.7 2.6 4.4 6.5 5.2 4.2
Notes: For each variable and country rst row is standard deviation of variable in logs in the model,
second row is the 5-95 percentiles of the posterior distribution in the model, and, third row is data.
For nding and separation probability they correspond to annual data, for the other variable they are
at the quarterly frequency.
447.3 Technology component in historical uctuations
We now show that there are important cross-country dierences in the ability of tech-
nology shocks to explain cyclical uctuations in labor market variables. To isolate
the role of technology shocks alone in inducing volatility we perform a historical de-
composition of the observables. This is possible thanks to the linearity of the model's
state space representation, which allows decomposing the observed time series of each
variable as the sum of the components due to each shock.23 In this way, the historical
paths of the observables that would have been obtained in response only to technology
shocks (either neutral or investment specic) is shown as the solid lines in Figure 3.
The actual data are represented by the dashed line. Panels a-f correspond to a dierent
country. In each panel we consider all observables with the exception of consumption,
due to space considerations.
The bottom row in each panel makes evident that in all countries the technology
component accounts for the bulk of the cyclical variation in GDP and investment.
In contrast, important cross-country dierences are visible when focusing on labor
market series. In the US (see panel a), technology shocks capture remarkably well the
historical evolution of unemployment, vacancies and nding probability|although they
slightly under-predict the fall in the nding probability during the recession of the early
1990s. This success in the US is more modest for separation probabilities. In Europe,
technology shocks explain virtually all of the cyclical uctuations of unemployment
and vacancies in Scandinavian countries (panels d and e) and to a lesser extent in
Germany (panel c). But the technology component alone fails to match the magnitude
of unemployment uctuations in France (panel b) and the UK (panel f), particularly
so during downturns. Technology shocks track the contours of nding probabilities in
Germany and Sweden, with uctuations being considerably smaller that in the data
for Norway, the UK and particularly France. In Europe the technology component
also fails to reproduce an important part of the uctuations of the job separation rate,
especially when considering the two Scandinavian countries. This last shortcoming
seems substantially more severe in all European countries than in the US.
23More specically, the Kalman smoother is used to infer the unique sequence of shocks, ["0
t;0
t]
(in the notation in section 5), which reproduce the observables. One can then feed subsets of these
shocks, e.g. neutral and investment specic, through the model to obtain the components for each
series driven by those disturbances only.
45Figure 3: Technology component due to technology shocks, Cross-country comparison














































































Counterfactual Data (b) France








































Counterfactual Data (c) Germany







































Counterfactual Data (d) Norway









































Counterfactual Data (e) Sweden






































Counterfactual Data (f) UK
Notes: Historical decomposition. Solid line is the technology component (due to neutral and
investment specic technology shocks), dashed line is the data.
467.4 Wage rigidity and the transmission of neutral shocks
Historical decompositions indicate that technology shocks alone are able to reproduce
the cyclical uctuations in unemployment, vacancies and nding probabilities in the
US, and, amongst European countries most prominently Sweden, followed by Germany.
Estimates of wage rigidity are highest for these two countries, which hints that in our
empirical model wage rigidity plays an important role in solving the so called Shimer
puzzle, in line with the conclusions by Hall (2005), Shimer (2005a) and Shimer (2010).
Although the degree of wage rigidity seems well identied from our data, this obser-
vation is certainly limited by the absence of compensation measures to estimate the
model. Bearing this caveat in mind, we perform a simple counterfactual exercise to
distill the contribution of wage rigidity in propagating the eects of neutral technol-
ogy in the US. Using the same methodology underlying our historical decompositions,
we condition on the estimated history of neutral shocks only and ask how the time
series of our observables would change if the degree of wage rigidity  was half of its
estimated value. All other parameters are left unchanged.24 Notice that the change in
 leaves unaected all steady state quantities. Comparing the historical and the coun-
terfactual resulting series driven by only neutral technology shocks we nd that the
cyclical properties of all series remain qualitatively unchanged, but volatility declines
considerably when there is less wage rigidity.25 This can be seen clearly from Table 8
that reports the standard deviations with low wage rigidity,  = 0:28, estimated wage
Table 8: Changing the level of wage rigidity in the US
US Standard Deviations  = 0:56  = 0:28 Data
Unemployment 8.23 4.89 8.23
Vacancy 12.32 6.98 13.45
Finding Probability 3.18 1.85 4.85
Separation Probability 0.89 0.60 2.80
GDP 0.87 0.76 0.94
Notes: Standard deviation of counterfactual paths when only US neutral technology shocks
are fed through the model at the estimated mode,  = 0:56, and when  = 0:28. All
remaining parameters are unchanged.
24A more thorough analysis of transmission mechanisms and identication is provided in Justiniano,
Lopez-Salido, and Michelacci (2010) using a richer model and dataset in the US.
25A comparison of the historical path relative to that in gure 3is available upon request and omitted
due to space considerations.
47rigidity  = 0:56 and in the data. With  = 0:28 the volatility of unemployment,
vacancies and nding probability would be roughly 3=5 of the value obtained under
the estimated value of .
7.5 Contribution of shocks to business cycles
The conclusions from the visual inspection of Figure 3 are conrmed by performing
a formal decomposition of the business cycle variance of the observables. Figures 4
reports the contribution of each shock to the variance of observables in each country
at business cycle frequencies, which correspond to cycles between 6 and 32 quarters,
as in Stock and Watson (1999). We compute the spectral density implied by the state
space representation of the DSGE model and decompose the variation of its diagonal
elements within the frequency band associated with business cycle uctuations. In this
case we report decompositions at the quarterly horizon for all series.
To save space we focus on unemployment in panel (a), vacancy in panel (b), the ow
probabilities in panel (c) and (d), GDP in panel (e) and investment in panel (f). In each
panel a country corresponds to a dierent bar. A more detailed variance decomposition
is reported in Table 9 in the Appendix. Panel (e) shows that neutral technology shocks
account for roughly 1/2 of the business cycle variability in GDP across all countries.
Investment specic shocks explain between 20 and 30 percent of cyclical movements in
GDP, with shares being somewhat higher in the US and Norway. In general matching
and job destruction shocks have a limited role in GDP and investment uctuations,
although their combined contribution is relatively larger in Great Britain and France.
Decompositions for consumption (omitted due to space considerations) also reveal a
high degree of homogeneity in the driving forces of national accounts data. While
neutral shocks are important for both investment and consumption in all countries,
investment specic shocks explain about half of investment variability, and discount
factor shocks account for 1/3 of consumption uctuations.
Turning to unemployment (panel a), it is clear that there is substantially more
heterogeneity in its cyclical drivers, compared to national accounts data, in line with
the evidence from Figure 3. Neutral shocks capture about 2/3 of cyclical uctuations
in unemployment in the US and Sweden, roughly 40 percent in Germany and Norway,
but less than 20 percent in France and Great Britain. Conversely, matching shocks
are far more important in these last two countries|contributing almost half of the
cycle in unemployment. Furthermore, almost 50 percent of the cyclical variance in
unemployment is due to job destruction shocks in France, with smaller shares elsewhere,
especially the US.
48Figure 4: Variance covariance decomposition at business cycle frequencies, cross coun-
try comparison








































































































































































Notes: Percentage of variance explained by each shock in each country at business cycle frequency
(cycles from 6 to 32 quarters). Decomposition are based on spectral density after correcting for
aliasing. 49Figure 4 (continued): Variance covariance decomposition at business cycle frequencies,
cross country comparison








































































Notes: Percentage of variance explained by each shock in each country at business cycle frequency
(cycles from 6 to 32 quarters). Decomposition are based on spectral density after correcting for
aliasing.
Cross-country dierences in the sources of labor market uctuations are also evident
in the job nding probability (panel c). As in the case of unemployment, neutral shocks
contribute fty percent or more to the business cycle of the job nding probability in
the US, but play a far more muted role in Norway, Great Britain and France. On
the other hand, matching shocks account for the bulk of the cyclical variability in
the nding probability in France and Great Britain, yet less than 20 percent in the
US. Although idiosyncratic shocks are quite volatile, their explanatory power over the
business cycle is limited to roughly 10 percent.
Regarding the separation probability, its cyclical variation is driven mainly by job
destruction shocks in all countries, with a couple of notable exceptions (panel d). In
Norway, matching shocks are the dominant source of its uctuation. Meanwhile, id-
iosyncratic shocks are superuous everywhere except Sweden, where their contribution
reaches 30 percent.
In summary, focusing on the labor market, we nd that neutral shocks explain
50the bulk of cyclical variations in unemployment, vacancies and nding probability in
the US, Sweden and to lesser extent Germany. Broadly speaking matching and job
destruction shocks are less important for unemployment and nding probabilities in the
US and Sweden than in Norway, the UK and France, with Germany being somewhere
in between. Finally, the contribution of discount factor and aggregate demand shocks
to labor market variables is fairly limited.
7.6 Cross-country comparisons in transmission mechanism
We now compare impulse responses to shocks across countries. We organize the pre-
sentation by shock, with aggregate demand and discount factor shocks omitted given
their small contribution to business cycle variability, particularly in the labor market.
We focus on the same variables as in Figures 3 and 4. The discussion is useful to
clarify the comovement properties induced by each shock and to better understand the
source of identication in the data. With full information methods it is not possible
to claim with certainty that specic correlations are responsible for identication. Yet
comparing the correlations generated by each shock with those in the data can help to
understand why a particular disturbance plays a more important role in one country
than in another.
Figure 5a reports the impulse response to a unitary neutral technology shock, a.
Dierent lines in each box corresponds to a dierent country. Qualitatively, impulse
responses are very similar across countries. Neutral technology shocks work exactly
as in the canonical textbook search model discussed in Pissarides (2000) leading to
an increase in nding rates and a decrease in the separation rate, expanding output
while inducing unemployment and vacancies to move in opposite direction. As shown
in Table 1, large correlations with these signs|positive between nding and vacancies,
negative for both with unemployment|are found in the US, Sweden and to lesser extent
Germany, which helps explain why in these countries neutral shocks are prominent
contributors to cyclical labor market uctuations. The comovements between vacancies
and both nding and the unemployment rate is instead substantially weaker in France,
where neutral shocks play a limited role in explaining the last two series.
Figure 5a also suggests some important dierences across countries in the quanti-
tative eects of neutral technology shocks on labor market variables. These elasticities
are in turn largest in Sweden (the country with the largest uctuations in labor mar-
ket variables in the data) followed by the US. In contrast, cross-country dierences
in the response of GDP, investment and consumption (not shown) are comparatively
smaller. This said, caution is required when comparing the magnitude of impulse re-
51sponses as they represent log deviations from (sometimes very) dierent steady states
(particularly when considering labor market variables). While this explains part of the
variation in magnitudes, dierences are also evident across countries with similar lev-
els of unemployment and labor ows. For instance, the elasticities of unemployment,
nding and vacancy rates are lowest for France, even compared to countries (such as
the UK and Germany) with similar unemployment rate and worker ow probabilities.
The responses to a unitary Marginal Eciency of Investment shock, ', are shown
in Figure 5b. MEI shocks are qualitatively similar to neutral shocks, but with stronger
impact eects on investment and a negative comovement between consumption and
investment|due to well-known substitution eects. This last observation suggests
that allowing for non separable preferences may substantially help the transmission of
MEI shocks, as suggested by Eusepi and Preston (2009). Finally, the propagation of
MEI shocks relies partly on strong responses in capital utilization, thereby rationalizing
the large utilization elasticities estimated in all countries.
Figure 5c presents the responses to a unitary matching shock, m. These distur-
bances have the distinctive property of generating a positive co-movement in nding
and separation probabilities. This helps explain the importance of matching shocks in
Norway, where the correlation between these two series is large and positive (Table 1).
When the separation rate is endogenous, the comovement between unemployment and
vacancies induced by matching shocks may be positive or negative, as noted by Hosios
(1994). This can be seen by comparing the impulse responses in the US and Germany,
where vacancies fall, with those in France and Great Britain in which unemployment
and vacancies move in the same direction. These considerations suggest rst that it is
dicult to infer the importance of matching shocks by just looking at the properties
of the Beveridge curve and, second, that having worker ow probabilities in the set of
observables is important for identication. In general, matching shocks generate large
movements in nding probabilities loosely correlated with the level of vacancies. Since
the correlation between nding probability and vacancies is particularly low in France,
Norway and the UK, this helps explaining why in these countries matching shocks
account for a large share of the uctuations in the job nding rate and unemployment.
Finally, Figure 5e traces out the eects of a unitary impulse in job destruction
shocks, . These disturbances drive any uctuations in job separation probabilities
that are not due to uctuations in the net value of a job. On impact, they tend to
generate a strong positive comovement between the separation probability and unem-
ployment. The empirical correlation between these two series is relatively higher in
Germany and France, which helps partly explain why job destruction shocks are fairly
52important for these countries.
Figure 5: Cross country comparison in impulse responses to a neutral technology shock
















































USA DEU GBR FRA NOR SWE
Notes: Impulse response to a unitary shock in a in all countries.
53Figure 5b (continued): Impulse responses to an MEI shock
























































USA DEU GBR FRA NOR SWE
Notes: Impulse response to a unitary shock in ' in all countries.
54Figure 5c (continued): Impulse responses to an matching shock






















































USA DEU GBR FRA NOR SWE
Notes: Impulse response to a unitary shock in m in all countries.
55Figure 5d (continued): Impulse responses to a job destruction shock













































USA DEU GBR FRA NOR SWE
Notes: Impulse response to a unitary shock in  in all countries.
568 Conclusions
In this paper we have set up a real business cycle model with search and matching fric-
tions driven by several shocks. The model nests full Nash Bargaining and wage rigidity
as special cases and includes other transmission mechanisms suggested by the literature
for the propagation and amplication of disturbances. The model is estimated using
full information methods, allowing for mixed frequency data, to study the properties of
unemployment, vacancies, unemployment ows, output, consumption and investment
in six dierent OECD countries. We have focused on the ability of technology shocks
to generate cyclical uctuations in line with the data. Our main nding is that while
technology shocks are the key driving force of national accounts variables in all coun-
tries, their contribution to labor market uctuations vary substantially both between
the two sides of the Atlantic and across countries within Europe. Technology shocks
alone replicate remarkably well the volatility in vacancies, unemployment and nding
probabilities observed in the US. But their success is mixed in Europe where matching
shocks and job destruction shocks play a substantially more important role than in the
US.
Our analysis should be extended along several dimensions. For instance, the pre-
sentation here abstracts from an in-depth analysis of the merits and shortcomings of
competing transmission mechanisms and their role in shaping dierences across coun-
tries. Relatedly, it would be interesting to understand why matching and job destruc-
tion shocks matter more in Europe than in the US. Looking at the eects of dierent
labor market institutions on the cyclical behavior of the labor market seems to be an
obvious rst step in trying to answer these questions.
The theoretical framework could also be expanded to model ows in and out of the
labor force whose importance over the business cycle is likely to vary by country. In
addition, specifying more general preferences that allow for consumption hours com-
plementarity might matter for results, as emphasized in Shimer (2010), particularly
considering some of the model's diculties in matching the comovement in consump-
tion. One might also want to incorporate an intensive margin of labor supply, to
increase the menu of possible relevant shocks, or, to allow for a richer structure in the
way information about shocks gets revealed to agents in the economy|as in the case of
\news" shocks (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2008). Finally, although our cross-country
analysis has been feasible thanks to the availability of annual comparable data on
workers ows, it might be useful to specify the model at the monthly, instead of quar-
terly frequency. This modication will inherently limit the cross-country dimension of
57the analysis but is particularly relevant for the US, where transitions occurs at very
high frequency.
In our view, the most compelling priority in expanding the model is to incorporate
direct measures of wages into the analysis and to better characterize the cyclical prop-
erties of the labor share. After all this is one of the key insights provided by Hagedorn
and Manovskii (2008) and Hornstein, Krusell, and Violante (2005). Of course in ex-
plaining the cyclical properties of the labor share one should build on Haefke, Sonntag,
and Van-Rens (2007) and Pissarides (2009) to recognize that wages in new and ongoing
jobs have very dierent implications for the allocation of resources in search models.
For example, and for given workers' bargaining power, the allocation of resources is
unaected by whether bargaining occurs continuously over time or just at the start
of the employment relationship by setting wages through long-term wage contracts.
However, dierent ways of splitting the surplus over the life of a match can matter
for the cyclical properties of the labor share. Moreover, the labor share exhibits rich
cyclical dynamics that, while informative, may prove challenging to model. In the US,
for instance, its correlation is negative with contemporaneous output, but positive with
output lagged three quarters or more{what R os-Rull and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2010)
refer to as the overshooting property of the labor share. The former correlation suggests
that some wage rigidity is present in the US data, while the latter correlation indicates
that wages do respond to aggregate shocks, albeit with a lag. We are currently working
an a monthly model of wage determination to account for the cyclical properties of the
labor share in the US, which also incorporates some of the model extensions discussed
above.
As it is standard in the search and matching literature, our analysis is based on
a real model where disturbances to aggregate demand cannot be the main drivers of
cyclical uctuations in output and employment. In alternative New Keynesian DSGE
models, where the presence of nominal rigidities makes output demand determined,
aggregate demand disturbances could have a lead role in cyclical uctuations. Indeed,
when estimating versions of these models with no unemployment, the literature has
found evidence that demand shocks matter and that (neutral and investment specic)
technology shocks play a more limited role in generating business cycles (Gal  and
Rabanal 2004, Justiniano et al. 2010). The importance of demand disturbances for
uctuations has also been studied in versions of the search and matching model with
nominal rigidities. For instance, in a calibrated framework, Sveen and Weinke (2008)
argue that monetary policy shocks could matter for unemployment uctuations. How-
ever, in an estimated model Krause, Lopez-Salido, and Lubik (2008) nd that these
58shocks contribute little to aggregate labor market uctuations. Their results point
instead to variations in unemployment and vacancies driven by markup shocks, which
they interpret as exogenous demand shifters (see also Rotemberg 2006). But, since
these disturbances cause prices and output to move in opposite directions, they can
be alternatively viewed as supply disturbances arising from changes in the marginal
costs of producers that aect desired markups. Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008) also
estimate a search and matching model with staggered wage setting and nd labor mar-
ket variations arise predominantly from investment specic disturbances which cause
prices and quantities to move in opposite directions.
In summary, demand disturbances are likely to play at least some role in the vari-
ability of both national accounts and labor market data, and it could well be that some
of the shocks here identied as driven by a change in technology would in other frame-
works be interpreted as disturbances to aggregate demand.26 Discerning the role of
aggregate demand versus supply shocks in cyclical uctuations has important norma-
tive implications in the design of the appropriate monetary and scal policy responses
to shocks. Clearly, allowing for demand-driven business cycles in a framework like ours
is an important area for future research. In our view, to understand the role of aggre-
gate shocks one needs a deeper theory for aggregate demand shifts that departs from
the common practice in the DSGE literature of modeling them as either purely mon-
etary disturbances or as exogenous shocks to preferences. Blanchard, L'Huillier, and
Lorenzoni (2009)aggregate demand uctuations based on informational frictions. In
their framework it is possible to think about changes in expectations that lead to shifts
in aggregate demand and to plausible variations in aggregate variables. This frame-
work seems to us a really promising way of incorporating demand shocks in models
with search and matching frictions.
26In Justiniano, Primiceri, and Tambalotti (2010), for example, disturbances isomorphic to our
preference and investment-specic technology shocks act as demand disturbances, inducing a posi-
tive comovement between output and prices. Moreover, in their environment, disturbances to the
investment equation (our investment-specic technology shocks) explain the bulk of the business cycle
variance in output.
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68Table 9: Variance covariance decomposition at business cycle frequencies, cross-country
comparison
Country: US France Ger-
many
Norway Sweden UK
Neutral technology shock a (%)
Unemployment 55 14 39 35 63 19
Vacancies 88 74 92 73 93 82
Finding 51 5 31 16 59 10
Separation 6 4 8 1 15 0
GDP 52 46 55 47 57 47
Consumption 25 26 22 21 25 13
Investment 19 19 26 20 29 18
Investment specic technology shock ' (%)
Unemployment 14 6 8 21 4 5
Vacancies 7 2 3 2 2 1
Finding 7 0 2 3 2 1
Separation 13 5 7 6 3 4
GDP 30 24 20 33 22 22
Consumption 25 20 22 29 17 27
Investment 72 68 58 76 64 57
Matching eciency m (%)
Unemployment 11 29 15 4 8 47
Vacancies 3 6 1 20 0 7
Finding 25 89 60 70 24 83
Separation 19 11 6 71 1 34
GDP 1 6 3 0 1 12
Consumption 1 3 1 0 0 2
Investment 0 2 1 0 0 5
Job Destruction  (%)
Unemployment 17 50 35 33 24 26
Vacancies 1 16 3 2 3 8
Finding 3 0 1 3 1 0
Separation 56 72 69 14 51 48
GDP 5 12 7 3 3 7
Consumption 4 6 3 2 2 1
Investment 1 4 3 1 1 3
Notes: Percentage of variance explained by each shock at periodicity 6-32 quarters. Decompositions
controls for aliasing.
69Table 9: Variance Covariance Decomposition (continued)
Country: US France Ger-
many
Norway Sweden UK
Discount factor shock b (%)
Unemployment 1 2 2 4 0 2
Vacancies 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finding 0 0 0 0 0 0
Separation 3 2 3 1 1 3
GDP 7 10 9 6 31 7
Consumption 37 39 39 27 47 1
Investment 6 7 7 2 4 3
Aggregate demand shock d (%)
Unemployment 1 0 1 3 0 1
Vacancies 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finding 0 0 0 0 0 0
Separation 1 0 2 1 0 1
GDP 5 2 6 12 6 7
Consumption 9 5 13 20 9 14
Investment 2 1 7 2 1 7
Idiosyncratic error (%)
Finding 13 5 6 8 14 6
Vacancies 0 2 0 1 1 1
Separation 2 7 6 5 29 10
Notes: Percentage of variance explained by each shock at periodicity 6-32 quarters. Decompositions
controls for aliasing.
70